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ABSTRACT

In his introduction to the course, Issues in Economic Geography, the author surveys the profession of geography, reviewing its history and its function in today's society and making recommendations for a "rethinking" of geography. He states that positivism, the search for emperically verifiable knowledge that makes an objective science of some aspects of human behavior and human affect upon the landscape, dominates geography but that an alternative, antiestablishment perspective is possible. Antiestablishment geographers believe that geography should be concerned with the human condition and include among its purposes the enlightment of the public and of policy makers. This new base for the discipline would consider equity in resource distribution, the responsiveness of various institutions to human needs, community development, and the harmony of man in his total environment. The argument for a humanistic rather than mechanistic science is posited against a view of a geographical establishment which exists to perpetuate itself. Only the instruction is available in this document. The remainder of the two semester course, including an abundance of copyrighted material, proceeds from the vantage point of the introduction to cover four "issues," beginning with imperialism and four "landscapes," studies of Sweden, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China. The entire document is available on loan from the ERIC clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Education, 855 Broadway, Boulder Colorado 80302. (JH)

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GEOGRAPHY 222 - ISSUES IN ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

COURSE NOTES: ISSUES AND LANDSCAPES

M.E. Eliot Hurst, 1974.

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1. Introduction - economic geographer: humanist or mechanic?

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Economic geography can be defined quite simply as a study of human behaviour in particular economic situations as they become imprinted on the landscape - whether that landscape be uptown Vancouver, the Chilean coastal plain, the Mekong Delta, or the newly emerging patterns of the Common Market.*

Economic Geography is of course merely a part of a whole discipline known as Geography, which a well known textbook claims is the "organised knowledge of the earth as the world of [people]."** In fact we can go further and say that Geography's role is to *reveal* people, that it is a *mirror for people*. That is, we look to the world, the earth, to elucidate the *world of humanity*. The root meaning of the word "world" from the German *Wer* is in fact, human being. So to know the world is to know ourselves.

At one level this is all very naive - a "wheat field" which we examine as economic geographers says something about people engaged in economic activities; but that statement is superficial. The evidence can be read more deeply; Geography reveals deeper levels of human nature. That "wheat field" may be the results of the dictates of a landlord acting in a particular economic system, or of the imperfect reading of demands by the farmer. Elsewhere the difference has been identified as that between *satisficer* and *optimiser*.***

This difference can be illustrated by an example: e.g. *imagine a house, someone's environment or world. The structure of the house obeys physical laws - the walls have to be of a certain strength in order to rise to a certain height and bear the roof of a certain weight. Economic constraints place some limits on aspects of the house such as its size, site, location, and the kinds of material used; cultural constraints may say something about orientation, ornamentation and layout.* That, I would claim, is as far as the traditional geographer goes in examining the world. He/she may quantify the number of bricks in the house, the spatial layout of the rooms, the costs of the structure, etc. This is the geographer as MECHANIC.

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* See M.E. Eliot Hurst, A geography of economic behaviour, Duxbury Press, North Scituate, 1972, Chapter 1.

**J. Broek and M. Webb, A Geography of Mankind, McGraw Hill, N.Y. 1968.

*** Eliot Hurst, op cit., pp. 19-20.

Within these economic, physical, and cultural constraints the owner of the house has freedom to establish his/her world, his/her scale of values and meaning. They may want to do this by painting the walls an unusual colour, by arranging the furniture geometrically, by always leaving the front door unlocked; or by not painting it, not repairing broken windows, by not tending the backyard. It is of course stretching the analogy too far to say that "the house is the person", since someone's world is far more than their house; but we can accept the idea that a careful reading of the house can tell us much about the occupant.

Geographers should therefore mirror people and their perspectives, must mirror "people-in-the-world", must reflect the nature of their experiences, must be concerned with being HUMAN. All of which seems very obvious yet in fact is a long way from the work-a-day concerns of the average economic geographer.*

The average geographer seeks meaning in order; that is he/she looks at the naive level of the landscape around them and sees on the whole what they want to see: a largely timeless and tidy world. Geographers have long been *environmentalists*, that is they operate in a world of objects where they have sought to establish "lawful" relationships between physical nature and people. At a very simple level, for example, to show how climate affects the slope of the roof or the orientation of the windows; behind this is a desire to find *general laws* of the nature A=B or X=Y. This NOMOTHETIC approach has led recently, in economic geography to the development of "location analysis", in which the spatial-economic constraints of "human" action are supposedly delimited. Location analysts like Peter Haggett and Brian Berry revived or introduced to English speaking audiences Christaller's *Central Place Model*, the work of Lösch, Von Thunen, and many others.** The Central Place Model, for example, delimits market areas for service activities of settlements of a certain size and threshold, and then within that mechanistic structure postulates that a hierarchy of cities occurs. The proof of the model, and some have called it a "law", is said to lie in its disobedience. Thus when ideological factors led authorities to establish integrated economic regions greatly in excess of the Christallerian market areas, location analysts predicted failure. In fact the venture was not too successful - but the causes lay not in Christaller's "laws" but over zealous Soviet-type centralisation.

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* See their typical textbooks: R. Thoman and P. Corbin, The Geography of Economic Activity, N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 3rd edition, 1974; R.L. Morrill, Spatial Organization, N. Scituate: Duxbury, 2nd edition, 1974; R. McNee, A Primer of Economic Geography; even the largest chunk of my A Geography of Economic Behaviour, op cit., can be likewise described.

** See for example chapters 6, 8, and 10 of Eliot Hurst, op cit. Criticisms of this approach, albeit now naive and behaviouristic are found in the same book in chapters 7, 9, and 11.

The location analyst's simplistic explanations are the level of most mechanical geography, the emphasis being on the geometry of the landscape *rather* than on its meaning. But as Pascall once said - doing geometry is altogether different from studying people. Geographers in fact need to know the world of meaning rather than the geometry of the world of objects. Such a distinction we should add quickly is not confined to geography! The world of "things" as opposed to the world of people is very typical of Western social science. Lenin himself commented "...where the bourgeois economist sees a relationship between *things*, others see a relationship between people".

The bourgeois approach towards objectifying the world can best cope with phenomena at the naive "structure-of-the-house level" it cannot cope with values, intentions and meaning. If the world in their sense is not reducible to a model (*an abstraction from reality*) then it is simply ignored. What is ignored of course is the real world of people.

Thus in geography, elements of the human landscape cannot really be explained at the geometric naive level, nor as simplistic sets of forces. Of course from time to time as an exercise we can use, for example, in Economic Geography, bourgeois economic "laws" such as the concept of *economically rational man*. But in so doing we are merely interpreting at one level some of the spatial regularities to be observed in economic landscapes, particularly where they have been stable over a long period of time (the geographer's "stable tidy world"). But those economic "laws" cannot explain the landscape from which those spatial regularities are abstracted. Those economic laws work in a "model" situation where you accept the ground rules of the logic of the game (bourgeois economics). But when reality is examined more closely, the model by definition and its laws and logic simply collapses and is inapplicable. As is most of western bourgeois economics and mechanical geography.

The geographic landscape is somewhat analogous to the interior of the house noted earlier, in that its totality reveals purposes and ends that have directed human energy; the means to the ends may seem "rational", but the ends themselves lie in another realm from either rationality or irrationality - the realm of the will and of the search for meaning of human values and motivations - in other words in a realm of purposeful human beings.

Geography must therefore dig beneath that outer shell of the distribution of widget factories, gizmo warehouses, the number of residences with stained glass windows, or fields of marijuana, the spatial distribution of which may have some passing fascination, but which alone tell us nothing about people, their feelings, passions, desires, intentions, who's screwing who. In other words it does not reflect everyday reality. It's only in that latter context that fields of grass have meaning.

At this point it is useful to look at a "sociology if knowledge"* approach to geography as a wholw which may put traditional economic geography into context. The following is a partially revised version of a paper published in Antipode, Vol. 5, 1973, pp. 40-59.

ESTABLISHMENT GEOGRAPHY, or how to be irrelevant in three easy lessons.

Preamble

This paper is an attempt to examine the sociology of American geography; despite emergent modes of analysis like phenomenology, a priorist studies deriving from Wittgenstein, and behaviourism, the dominant mode of thought remains embedded in positivism, and positivist geographers have risen to positions of power and influence. Small forays into more radical analysis and community participation, have to date been effectively squashed by the neofeudal structure of the American education system. This latter system encourages positivism, first to get your degree(s) done, and then as an ideological position by placing over-emphasis on the practical needs of graduation, promotion, and "professionalism". The current positivist stance and scientistic approach leads to the view that knowledge is inherently neutral and that the standard and exactness of the physical sciences is the only explanatory model for knowledge; this leads in turn to a refusal to view Geography as a humane enterprise basically concerned with the human condition (albeit as spatially displayed!) The scientistic approach leads

* "Sociology of knowledge is a newly developing area of holistic social science. Basically the sociology of knowledge takes a discipline or subdiscipline and breaks it down analytically into its religious, scientific and ideological biases and poses fundamental questions, like in our case, what is geography for? Whom does its disciplinary knowledge serve? What makes up a discipline tick? What values are espoused? Which masters are worked for? Do we devise master plans or the master's plans. In other words, knowledge for whom? The sociology of geography has a fundamental goal: the discovery of the social roots of the discipline.

to an emphasis on observation, normative laws and statistical verification; the "quality", the formal elegance, and the mathematical rigor, at an extreme can count for more than the purposes for which geography is employed.

Thus, we find geography at the present time in the hands of several thousand *believers* (positivists and others), with outside that feudal empire a few geographers marginal to the mainstream who see positivism as philosophically crude; these latter geographers pose the question, to paraphrase Anne Buttimer, should we be satisfied with drafting an opaque objective map of socioeconomic spatial patterns, or should we supplement these mechanical exercises with the subjective dimensions provided by humanism, dialectical materialism, existentialism, intuitionism, phenomenology? Need we ask, geography for whom? Unfortunately we have to, since the establishment of geography is firmly entrenched in its ivory tower.

The basic theme of this paper, therefore, is that the existence of a conformist establishment structure in Geography, combined with the growth of quantification and the deification of *prescriptive scientism*[1] by a vocal minority of geographers has militated against a dynamic and socially involved Geography; a Geography which is aware of and involved with contemporary problems, that is concerned with the human condition and the radicalisation

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[1] I use this term to refer to the contemporary self image of science, in conformity with other antipositivist methodologists like Husserl and Voegelin. Scientism is the culmination of the positivist tradition and has become dominant in both established American social science and the scientific materialism of orthodox Marxism. In addition to the tenets mentioned above, we should add a third, that there exists in fact a unitary scientific method.

of man.[2]

Historical Sketch

The establishment orientation of geographers is as old as geography itself (Eliot Hurst, 1972a). Descriptive writings of the earth and its inhabitants are found in the oral traditions of classical Greece and are reflected in the works of Homer. But it was Erastosthenes, three centuries before Christ, to whom we must credit the first publication and use of the word *geography*. Geographers following Erastosthenes continued to write about the lands and people of the Greek *ecumene*-Ptolemy, Strabo, and others wrote about the natural attributes of a place, how it was related to other places on the earth's surface, made cosmographic measurements. But who benefited from this new knowledge? Who profited from this new breed of man, the geographer? "... and so from the earliest times geographers described, measured, all the better for other men to subdue and exploit the earth. Need we ask, geography for whom?" (Ibid). Was it for the slaves, or the women in the Athenian *polis*? Was it for the brutes and barbarians who were without the walls? Or was it a veneer to the literati of a small elite group, and an extension to their control of the socioeconomic system? As Gordon Childe has

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[2] This growing awareness on my part owes a great deal to a number of people both within and without Geography; to the writings of Martin Nicolaus, Ernest Mandel, I.L. Horowitz, and Katheleen Gough Aberle in sociology, political economy and anthropology; at an earlier stage to a number of colleagues at Simon Fraser University including Edward Gibson and Jim Sellers; to the promptings of Clark Akatiff who persuaded me to attempt to commit the Fresno presentation to paper; to the ordeals of the past eight years at Simon Fraser and other North American universities; and to my wife, who struggled in parallel with me, she in Anthropology, to overcome our establishment training.

noted "... the surplus produced by the new economy ... [from its urban base] ... was in fact concentrated in the hands of a relatively small class. Such concentration was doubtless necessary for the accumulation of absolutely small individual contributions into reserves sufficient for the great tasks imposed on civilised society. But it split society into classes and produced further concentration in the new economy. For it limited the expansion of industry and consequently the absorption of the surplus rural population" (1961, p. 99). Or as Brecht put it more poetically:

> Who built the seven gates of Thebes?
> The books are filled with names of kings.
> Was it kings who hauled the craggy
> blocks of stone?
>
> Each page a victory.
> At whose expense the victory ball?
> Every ten years a great man.
> Who paid the piper?

And so from the earliest times geographers described and stockpiled, all the better for a small group of men to subdue and exploit the earth and other men.

From Ptolemy and Strabo we leap across a period of more than fifteen hundred years to Varenius, Cluverius, and Kant. We leap into a period of expanded map making, attempts to open up the world for the new merchant-adventurers carrying exploitative Western mercentalism to Africa, Asia, and eventually to South America. Geographer-explorers open the way for genocide, exploitation, gold, greed and Christianity (Blaut, 1970).

Descriptive geography jumped on the band wagon in its zealous investigation of the expanding, newly revealed Darwinian world. In this expanding world the need was still for description and the stockpiling of facts; they were sufficient for the time. Geographer-explorers, geographer-missionaries, underwritten by royal geographical societies, paved the way with their feasibility reports for the following army of traders, military men, mining companies and the plantation companies. And so the concern became purely

economic - how much wealth can be gained from the earth and where is it located? How can we get more - and more! And where did the wealth, the geographers' foreshadowed reach - to the industrial tenement of Victorian Britain, to the Londoners of Dickens' descriptions, to the unemployed, or to the newly landed immigrant in the United States?

Descriptive geography locates and describes but does not attempt to explain why something is where it is; it has its roots in the desire to amass information about those newly revealed environments of Darwin's world. It describes that which is most visible: spatial patterns of agriculture, manufacturing, settlements, transport networks, trade flows. Where it attempts to explain the occurrence of phenomena and their interrelationships it tends to rely on physical determinism or simple economic rationalisations. There is little concern with change, uncertainty, human fallibility, or with people.

The second major stream of geography, the quantitative and predictive approach has its roots in the more recent past, although the legacies of particularism and description persist. The recent changes in the other social sciences, notably their adoption of positivism or some variant thereof, the use of quantitative methods, aided in turn by the growth of the computer, has rubbed off on the geographer. Replacing the explorer-geographers' feasibility reports for the following merchants, are the background reports, social surveys, and spatial analyses for the military-industrial complex and the corporate multinational tentacles of the neo-capitalist state. Geographers remain the appendages of a power elite; but with the rise of the respectability of the scientific method, attempts to find the source of the Nile or the easiest paths for railroad expansion, are replaced by the computer printout

of marketing information or the logistics of determining the "enemies'" My Lai. We should not be surprised at this; indeed the maturity of a social science is frequently gauged by how far it has come in a tradition that started with classical empiricism and moved to logical empiricism and moved to logical empiricism (or logical positivism); in turn the increasing prestige of the other social sciences and their use of models and statistical techniques in an attempt to manage human behaviour were bound to encourage geographers to adopt something of their methodology and of their concern with prediction. This concern with precision, measurement, and normative situations has led to the adoption of a wide range of statistical tools and models from regression analysis through linear programming to graph theory and systems analysis.

This quick historical sketch, though far from complete, provides some kind of setting for North American geography today. The essential point is that geography, indeed *academe* in general, is but an integral part of our socioeconomic system; indeed that it responds to society's greater needs, reflects its irrationality and inhumanity and helps to purvey myths favourable to the *status quo*. Geography, like the other social sciences, sciences and technology serves as a strategy for legitimating power and privilege. Although the following words of Gouldner refer to establishment sociology, it is not difficult to substitute the word "geography". Gouldner characterises the establishment social science as the purveyor of a myth ".....of a progressive society, whose very disturbance is a sign of progress, of the America blessed by George Washington, where democracy goes hand in hand with affluence. It is a myth made persuasive by a number of techniques. One is the technique of calling the partly filled glass of water half-filled, rather than half-empty; where American Blacks are described as one third middle class, rather than two-thirds miserable. It is a myth consecrated by the strategy of the Great Omission ... the word "imperialism" does not appear in the index ..... But myths are not merely narrative tales that begin with

once upon a time" and end with "They lived happily ever after". Most powerfully of all, myths are incorporated invisibly into the total view of social reality by the entire structure of language and conceptualization. When the bloody struggle to register Blacks in the South becomes the frictionless "extension" of the franchise, a mechanical way of viewing *all* social change is implicitly communicated". (1968, pp. 248-9).

The vaunted "new" geography (Gould, 1967) which as we shall see below probably began on the margins of geography, is now past its peak. The "new" geography has the *rigor*, but also, alas, the *mortis*. What lies ahead is uncertain as to detail, but of one thing we can be certain, based on past performance, the *mortis* will be with us, and with it the establishment subservient to the interests of the *status quo*.

The Rise of Positivism

Impressed with the apparent successes of the physical sciences, those who studied men, societies, and landscapes, rushed in to get on the bandwagon and to cash in on some of the spoils. Objectivity, empirical research, and rigor became the key words in what were to be called the "social sciences". The goal is knowledge; who uses and controls that knowledge, whether we are asking the right kinds of questions, and other such questions are relegated to the epistemologist, the philosopher, and the odd radical, all of whom are considered rather too intellectual for the down to earth (or desk!) geographer. The basic idea behind the positivist approach is the dichotomy of life and knowledge, knowing and living, that there is an objective world with knowable laws that can be determined through various empirical testing procedures. Given knowledge of these laws and facts about landscapes, men can then decide how to live in them. The goal is the elevation of geography to the level of an objective science studying some aspects of human behaviour and their overt results in the landscape.

The customary explanations of the rise of positivism usually center on references concerning the pitfalls of doing geography any other way. Thus its practitioners speak of positivism as a reaction to mere description (ideographic geography) or to historicism.[3] Others have offered the jaundiced view that positivistic geography coincides with the general analyticity and pursuit of scientism current in the present age.[4] And then there are those who see in the positivistic stance the best method for obtaining "factual" results independent of ideological or value judgements.[5]

In response to this *prescriptive scientism*, as we called it earlier, geography has become concerned with, amongst other things, "law" seeking, model building, and the articulation of theory[6]; few seem to question whether scientism is appropriate to the study of geography's principal focus - man. In fact no "laws" have been produced in geography, and probably never will be.

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[3] Amongst others, Burton (1963) makes this clear when he saw "... the movement towards quantification as part of the general spread and growth of scientific analysis into a world formerly dominated by a concern with the exceptional and unique". This was also apparent in the so called *Iowa approach* - see for example Kohn (1967), McCarty and Lindburg (1966) and others.

[4] The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Geography (Division of Earth Sciences) makes this very clear (N.A.S. - N.R.C., 1965).

[5] The best way to illustrate this is Sellers'(1969a) prophetic statement - "the literature of establishment geography essentially begins with Ackerman's *Geography as a fundamental research discipline*, is crystallised in the Ad Hoc Committee's *Science of Geography*, and most recently reinforced by Golledge and Amedeo ... We can expect it to be perpetuated by David Harvey's forthcoming text *Explanation in Geography*"[p. 1240]. Harvey's text (1969), from which he has since backtracked a little, did in fact prove to be the pinnacle of the positivistic value-free approach, only since surpassed and pushed to an almost ludicrous extreme by Abler, Adams, and Gould (1971).

[6] The most grotesque example of this is Golledge and Amedeo (1968).

Scientism can make some descriptions more exact, like Berry's (1964) approach to regional analysis, but it is of no explanatory value, no aid to understanding. It is, in fact, comparatively easy now in geography to describe in mathematical terms fairly complex patterns without any understanding of the basic processes involved, as for example when simulating the diffusion of an innovation through space, without understanding why some people accept it and others do not. Few geographers have actually gone beyond the first step of *pattern identification;* patterns are described, can be simulated, but it is usually beyond the competence of geographers using the ideographic or nomothetic approaches to explain them. Rather than being *scientific*, perhaps we should grace geographers with the term *technique-oriented.*

Scientism, as the positivistic self-image of science, also separates the subject and object of knowledge and takes the statements of science as an observational given. Knowledge is thus conceived as a neutral picturing of fact. In geographical terms this implies that man learns about his environment only through objective study; cognitive processes light the path for human progress. Events that are still mysterious are not yet understood because they have not been adequately studied in an objective manner.

The positivist tradition has had an extremely high payoff in the physical sciences, and it is not surprising that the methods of these sciences should be seized by social scientists, including geographers, to "advance" their own disciplines. However, it should also be obvious there are considerable drawbacks when you come to study man. At the core of logical empiricism lies the principle of verifiability, and it is this principle that determines what questions can be asked. Thus to have any meaning, a proposition must be such either that it is true by definition or that some possible sense

experience would be relevant to the determination of its truth. By such a criterion, propositions like "I exist" would be meaningless, as would other human emotions such as joy, hate, love or grief. Now I am not advocating a geography of love, although there is no reason why there should not be such an approach[7], but any approach to landscape patterns which involves man as a central figure, as geography must, would in a positivist approach either have to relegate man to "object" or "unit" status, or face much legerdemain in trying to cast such an approach in synthetic propositional form. In fact this is exactly what occurs in quantitative studies and in many of the so called "behavioural" studies which have a positivist twist (for example Morrill, as a treatment of man the object, or Horton and Reynolds, for rattomorphic man - both in McConnell and Yaseen [1971]). Unfortunately the same "objective" values and the belief in the neutrality of the observer are rampant throughout the social sciences, including geographers who are taking non-quantitative approaches.

Positivism is of course only *one* of a number of philosophical positions that can be adopted in the social science. I would agree with Maslow that a positivistically based social science may help us study people as *objects*, but we also desperately need to study them as *subjects* who *do* exist. Unfortunately the latter approach might be too revealing of the values perpetrated by our capitalist system. As such, most geography is presented in a positivistic vacuum, since it is supportative of the *status quo*.

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[7] Since first writing this I have come across a collection of essays and poems written by a geographer about this topic (Buchanan, 1970)!

FIGURE 1.

THE STRUCTURE OF ESTABLISHMENT GEOGRAPHY:
ROLE AND STATUS



Structure of the Discipline

There are three basic strands involved in building up a picture of "establishment" geography. First, that there is within geography a partly structured establishment, which tries to impress conformity to the *status quo*; secondly, that within the establishment the growth of positivism or what we also called prescriptive scientism holds sway in an ideological sense, even though only a minority of geographers may fully adhere to or understand what that way-of-knowing infers - this is equivalent to Kuhn's (1970, postscript) *disciplinary matrix*, or ensemble of group commitments; and thirdly - that the existence of an establishment and the overall ideology of positivism, militates against a radical geography, i.e. a non-conservative human study of the existing order.

Roles

From the structural point of view, following Horowitz (1964, 1965), we can view "geography" as a fraternity of some five or six thousand *believers*. This body of people have in common a basic attitude to life which is dominated by the search for human meaning through geographical training and "truths" and who derive their livelihood as either *school hands* or *field hands*.

Outside of this fraternity of believers lie the markets or *publics* which geography serves. These markets include the community users of geography (planners, government organisations, etc., including military and intelligence agencies), the corporate world, and by far away the largest public, the undergraduate, the long suffering, all too frequently neglected component of the University system. The introductory course, and their associated textbooks, have become the basic commodities for sale in this University market.

The believers encompass some distinctive role playing (Figure 1). Along one axis we can identify the *strivers after immortality*, the one hundred or so bishops and archbishops who are basically concerned with interpreting the geographical sacred scrolls, whose names constantly reappear in AAG committees and in the roll call of invited symposia. These "theorists" may also add to or subtract from the holy body of knowledge. The geographical *College of Cardinals*, which includes past presidents of the AAG and others of its high officials, is usually drawn from this pool of prophets.

Another axis in Figure 1, includes the several hundred *elite secularists* who seek for more earthly rewards, i.e. hard cash. The leadership of this group usually maintains links with the various foundations and agencies granting funds; the scope of such studies and the rewards vary from studies of transport networks and settlement patterns for military counter insurgency plans to the best location of gas stations for oil companies.

Besides these two basic axes, the priests and the princes, there is a *third estate* of some five thousand or so nuclear members. These are the believers who do not apparently know the "truth" at its most esoteric, creative, or revealed level, but who can be relied upon to act as a kind of officer corps, to steer the initiate through the puberty ceremonies, and who can be relied upon to rise in righteous wrath against enemies from without or transgressors from within.

To these groups we must add that initiate, the *novice in residence*, the body of graduate students who are being forced through the geography mill in preparation for running an independent garrison or parish. This painful period of adjustment to a world of superordination and subordination includes

factors more subtle and complex than the fulfillment of formal requirements and prerequisites. The novice must learn the obligations of lords, bishops, and guardians to their dominion; he must learn the habits, idiosyncracies, and expectations of the profession in general, and his supervisory committee in particular (to which he is assigned as *recording secretary!*) A measure of advancement in such a process is how well he knows the prophet behind the sacred scrolls, no less than their contents. By this process the classroom, seminar, and office fuse into the establishment of geography as such.

Views

The *disciplinary matrix* of geography represents an ensemble of group commitments. This ensemble contains a collection of theories, techniques, beliefs, values, and so on, to which the majority of geographers are committed. The matrix provides the basic conceptual frameworks in which research is conducted, determines the questions that will be asked and determines the form that answers, to be acceptable, must assume. While there are several schools of geographic thought, they generally agree on the basic concerns of geography, and in fact these various categories into which views fall are on the whole compatible. This compatibility, or existence of a disciplinary matrix, contributes to the feeling for a core of knowledge or an approach, that we call "geography". Table 1 is an attempt to crystallise the various approaches, which nonetheless fall under the general rubric of "establishment geography". To this end we can identify the gamesmen (the scientific empiricists), the occupationalists (the silent majority) and the ungeographers (the administrators, etc.). This schema is a gross over-simplification of course, since in reality these are tendencies rather than polar groups, but it is useful to examine them to see how the establishment perpetuates itself and yet encompasses disparate views.

TABLE 1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL ESTABLISHMENT: APPROACHES AND VIEWPOINTS. (Based on Horowitz, 1964a)

	THE GAMESMEN	THE OCCUPATIONALISTS	UNGEOGRAPHERS	MARGINALS
1.	Geography defined by those educated in the field. Geography a job rather than a calling.	Geography defined by its content rather than those who practice it. Rely on geography as a teacher or writer.	Predominant loyalty to the institution employing them. May defend educational institution even at the risk of negating geography.	Geographical boundaries less important. Seeks ideas and methods outside the discipline. May be professional "radical."
2.	Belief in jargon, and the scientific method. A high premium on professionalism, special status and cash rewards. Operates within an elitist exclusive framework.	Shares belief in value neutrality and objectivity but tends to hold some positivist values in disdain; tends to operate in an inclusive framework.	Small range of problems considered; administrative duties parmamount, or just sleeps. Attitudes to geography conventional and non emotive.	Cosmopolitan, messianic, proselytizer. Token radical.
3.	Institution held to be effective. Defends social myths, upholds ongoing social ideology. Conservative.	Populist. Ongoing social ideology strongly defended (within a liberal framework), conservative, supportative of status quo.	Extremely conservative.	Liberal to radical; challenges some institutions and selected aspects of the status quo. Retires at night to comfortable fireside.
4.	Strong emphasis on consensus, testability, reliability, measurability. Model building, data collection, techniques strongly emphasised. *Nomothetic geographer.*	Uniqueness, "quality of mind" emphasized. Romantic image of innovation. Individual evaluation of data; many techniques seen as subservient to insight and talent. *Idiographic geographer*	Research and writing does not go beyond requirement of graduate training - not considered a value. Gentlemen's view of the field. *Administrator/ Dilettante*	Alienated view of the world - identifies with the marginal groups in the other social sciences. Geography seen as parochial. *"Ginger Group"*
5.	Distinction made between fact and value. Research findings seen as neutral.	Values and ethics of others sometimes taken into account; geography may be seen as an interplay of fact and value. But the observer is conceived as neutral and his results are "objective."	Antiphilosophical. Rarely goes beyond doctrine of common sense. Foregoes philosophical implications of scholarship if they impede bureaucratic development.	Geography good when it solves issues in a total way. Prophilosophy, often searching for new approaches. Values may be of more importance than facts.

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TABLE 1. Continued

	THE GAMESMEN	THE OCCUPATIONALISTS	UNGEOGRAPHERS	MARGINALS
6.	For whom is geography useful? - whoever can utilise data (the market place.)	What are the values of goegraphy? -- society (in the conservative sense), and geography as knowledge.	Administration more important than intellect.	Functions as a critical pivot. The *liberal conscience* of the discipline.
7.	Professional orientation. Natural sciences seen as very prestigious. Computer technology provides the means.	Areas of prestige - history, the humanities some social science.	Promotion and advancement based on loyalty to the institution and administrative work.	Turns to existentialism, phenomonology, behaviourism, even Marxology - anything that is not mainstream. Geography, in search of new ideas.
8.	Has clear understanding of rules or conventions of research, rites of passage. Emphasizes techniques and the formal elegance of presentation. Seeks approval of peers. Wishes to maintain a set of standards agreed within geography, particularly positivists. Conformism paramount.	A lower degree of cohesion, less structured view of the discipline, somewhat looser view of academic roles. Encourages individuality within the general academic framework, some criticism encouraged, deftness of presentation lauded; but deviance abhorred when it strays outside the "liberal" confines.	Small town/rural attitudes. Looks at small or mid-range problems. Does not raise theoretical issues or look at cutting edges. Acts within the consensus of the established academic framework. All deviance abhorred.	Encourages individuality, innovation, criticism. Mode of presentation unimportant. By virtue of ideology writes/lectures much, polemic style. But at the crunch point a bleeding-heart liberal. Despite all his marginality, supports the <u>status quo</u> (though via the back door).

To the three basic groups, we can add "the marginals", some of whom teeter on the edge of the establishment, and others of whom are definitely without. Some marginals (like those of Table 1) are tolerated, since some of their views and innovations have been, and can be, incorporated into the basic disciplinary matrix (e.g. quantitative techniques and quantifiers played such a role in the early 1950's; behavioural geographers in the mid 1960's).

The gamesmen (Table 1), quantifiers, or players of the science game, are the chief espousers of *the* scientific method and the main source of the articulation of positivism within geography. They seem to be mainly concerned with developing a geographic picture of the world which to all intents and purposes, jumps at you from the data and models they utilise. As noted in the section on positivism, such geographers emphasise observations independent of action, criteria of verificiation separate from criteria of valuation, and the objective modes of human experience rather than the subjective humane experiences. Thus this geographer builds up a picture of man and landscape from the natural science viewpoint, from a combination of "hard" data, surveys, and other atomic facts, relying on testable hypotheses and quantitative analysis. The quantifier-geographer controls variance because that might impede or impinge on the experimental situation, but in doing so he rules out a whole range of variables that might be interesting. The quality and formal elegance of the geography performed counts far more than the purposes for which the geography is employed; the quantifier uses firm rules and conventions, "laws"; he simply wants " to know" as an end. Worst of all perhaps, is the fact that extreme emphasis on objective consciousness, means that man and landscape are seen as orderly, predictable, and controllable, which in their turn come to be viewed as the most desirable attributes of society.

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There is no doubt that the extremes of the late 50's and early 60's perpetrated by this group will not be repeated, but many of their values and beliefs have lastingly been adopted by the geography establishment. Although the peak may have been reached, several reviews indicate the occasional outburst still occurs (Eliot Hurst, 1971a, 1972b). If I may quote briefly from one of those reviews "... only some small part of that experiential space is susceptible to quantitative analysis. Do we ignore the rest? Or do we surreptitiously manufacture an *abstract* landscape in order to counterfeit *reality;* and then having reduced something to an abstraction do we then convince ourselves that it is, in fact, real?"

The occupationalists have a vested interest in the idea content of geography as well as its bureaucratic norms. But this stream of geography is only occasionally productive, since intellectual orientation is normally interpreted to mean minimal or no organised involvement or participation.[8] They rely on geography as basically providing a 9 to 5 job and a niche as teacher or writer. Idiographic geographers would be categorised in this stream, with their stronger belief in the individual evaluation of data, deftness of presentation, abhorence of deviance, but their evaluation of techniques as being somewhat subservient to individual insight and talent.

Obviously there is a lower degree of cohersion amongst the occupationalists than amongst the quantifiers, since they have a less structured view of the discipline and encourage to some extent individuality, providing it's within a general North American academic framework. They share, however, with the quantifiers, the belief that geography should not succumb to social

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[8] Stoddart (1967) reports in a recent survey that 32% of the geographic believers never publish at all, for which on the whole we should probably be thankful.

pressure, social relevance (or "subjectivity"), since there would be a "loss of knowledge against the long range interests of society itself".[9] This of course is one of the tenets of prescriptive scientism, and implies that the ways-of-knowing or the disciplinary matrix of geography are the only methods of approaching reality.

The third stream of establishment geographers do little for the discipline in academic terms, though they share the common training and common beliefs of all geographers. The ungeographer has found a safe haven in which, once he has overcome the hurdle of tenure (which in reality is no hurdle if you conform to all the norms of the academe), he may seek for local power independent of geographic tasks or may assiduously avoid all duties and commitment and effectively do nothing; in both cases they support the *status quo* in geography, the university, and society. Nearly all departments have their quota of ungeographers; fundamentally their allegiance is the institution as such, and probably if they do climb the power hierarchy, will calmly ditch geography. It is this category of geographers who in the longrun do more to destroy student interest in

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[9] "I note with sadness the continuing politicalization of American geographers ... I fear that glowing phrases ... about resources, environment and so forth have led men of good will to vote *as geographers* for a politically loaded statement ... The business of geography is geography, not politics" (Carter, 1970). Somehow it is overlooked that "objectivity" is an ideology too! Carter concludes "... it is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of scholarship and of learned societies to demand that they become centers of partisan power politics. In our case the end of such tactics will be the splintering of our society and the discrediting of geography as a scholarly field". I would suggest that pp. 185, 198, 265, 353 and 468 of Carter's textbook (1968) makes his "objective" status very questionable.

geography than to stimulate interest. The ungeographer finds discomfort with intellectual brilliance and with any intellectual effort. Through colleges and universities, large and small, are to be found these "elder statesmen" and young ungeographers who feel more threatened by geographical talents than inspired by them, but who see any rocking of the boat, any deviance to shatter their slumber or challenge their power game, as "radical" and to be expunged. Geography has one or two notable cases where sleepers have crept out of the woodwork to expel radical elements - usually on the basis of deviant grading practices!!

These three groups represent, in conjunction with the roles outlined above, the *mainliners*, the establishment of geography. Table 1 also includes a fourth group, the *marginals*, who tend to be critical of the establishment, of its conservatism, objectivity, value-neutrality, and of many of its methods; they tend to draw their inspiration from a wide range of social sciences, from philosophy, and increasingly from the radical sections of economics, sociology, and political science. This eclecticism is not confined to the marginals, but they do tend to see the boundaries of geography as unimportant, in fact they tend to identify establishment geography as parochial with overly arbitrary and narrow limits to debate and discussion.

Those on the borders of the establishment play a role for the mainliner; they remind him that geography need not be transient in value and temporary in significance; since they tend to have a well worked and philosophical system or at least be pro-philosophy, they supply the mainliner with epistemological respectability; from time to time they can introduce new methods, which provided they can fit into the mainline disciplinary matrix, may yield considerable payoff - quantification, computer techniques, network

analysis, behaviourism, cognitive interactionism, phenomenology, existentialism, linguistics, communications, even a little Marxology. These marginals can remind the establishmentarian from time to time that his grants are due to the conservatizing needs of corporate and government institutions. They can point out how many of his positions on standards and measures are really postures taken defiantly in the absence of firm standards. They can remind the establishment geographer that his insistence on the appropriate rites of passage rests on primitive puberty rites. To this extent, the *marginal to the establishment*, acts as both the liberal conscience of the establishment, and the generator of new ideas to bolster up the flagging discipline. Those ideas which fit the ongoing values of the disciplinary matrix are gratefully incorporated, those which do not, are quietly sabotaged. Those marginals who play this kind of role are themselves part of the establishment, in fact a crucial part; they never seriously challenge the *status quo* - they simply make it a richer experience and a more diverse practice, and quietly rationalise the idea of an unchanging society.

There is also a small group of marginals who do not play an establishment role; this group we can call the anti-establishmentarians, and naturally are not listed in Table 1, since they challenge orthodox geographical beliefs and seriously question the ideal of our current *status quo*. They may even have a commitment to revoluntary change. The anti-establishmentarian is seen as a dangerous challenge to the mainliner (and of course if he is serious and sincere, he is ...) and unlike the token marginal-to-the-establishment who is tolerated and even fostered, is likely to be fired from his job, denied promotion or tenure, refused admittance to graduate school, and eventually completely ostracised. Since they lie completely outside

the establishment no more need be said for the moment.

Now this structure of geography would not be so cohesive, if it were not also shored up by a series of concrete institutions and sanctions - textbooks, professional meetings and journals, research grants, etc., (Boland, 1970). A glance at several of these institutions will illustrate how the norms and values of the establishment are ensured to survive.

Textbooks

The agreed on textbooks are deliberate attempts to represent the ongoing consensus as to what are the accepted facts (and theories) in a given section of geography. Textbooks have long been the major vehicle for inculcating students into geography's disciplinary matrix, which a technological change like paperbacks has only tended to increase rather than challenge. The logic of the textbook business is such that a book can only become one of the *standard* textbooks if it does in fact represent the consensus of both content and form. The standard textbook contains the latest accepted theories in a given area of geography. Any would-be textbook whose content deviates from this will fail, at least as a textbook, because it will not be generally used.

The form in which the textbook is presented is also conventionalized; for example, in economic geography where the consensus is very strong, one finds that all texts contain only minor variations in their tables of contents, all are merely variants of the traditionally accepted subject matter and approach. Furthermore all the standard textbooks have a chapter (usually introductory) on methodology which does nothing more than state the *conventions*, emphasize the techniques, and plays down any controversy or any notion of social relevancy.

Some examples from textbooks may help underline this contention.

There is, for example, a World Geography which devotes 40 pages to Meso-America yet dwells almost exclusively on the products which the area ships to North America (the "where do our bananas come from?" approach). In this and many other texts the image projected is that of a non-western world geared to supply our needs (and though the student never learns this) at prices which we choose to bestow. This is the classic cultural tendency to describe not the important attributes of a place and a people, but simply to describe those attributes which are relative to ourselves. In this same text we also find a stream of cognitive projections of an image of non-western areas which are environmentally poor unless developed (exploited) by the West. Similarly an image is projected of the occupants of these lands as being "primitive" in two important ways: they are unable to comprehend by themselves the virtues of advanced capitalism and its technological apparatus; that they are unwilling or unable to adopt the elementary consumption traits which justify the label "civilised".

In this text we read of a typical Bantu village near the Congo River; it is reached by "...many narrow trails deep in the forest" (n.b. not routeways) "...its huts [not houses] are small and dark...and are barricaded at night against wild animals". It is furnished with "...some baskets and wooden bowls" and little else. The men meanwhile work their "clearings" (not fields), but, "with their poor tools and simple methods of farming" are unable to fight the undergrowth which "begins to creep into the clearing from all sides". These Congolese gardeners "make no plans for storing food". But at the nearby trading post the busy "white" manager is buying produce from the populace who, nevertheless, begin immediately "...to spend the money received only a few minutes ago". In sum the Congolese natives are portrayed as manifestly too primitive to handle their own affairs, a classic argument for the benefits of imperialism.

The same text tells us that: "African history has its real start with the coming of the Portuguese"; that the slave trade was damaging, but apparently was more the fault of Arab traders than Europeans; apartheid is mentioned, though not condemned, and no word is given of North American investment in South Africa or *vice versa;* there are no mined cities (and thus no traces of "civilization") south of the Sahara; industry is the only route to economic salvation; "European" and "Asian" are two of the races found in Africa; Africa is only of interest to North America because of its geopolitical importance, mineral resources, agricultural products, etc - but we do find the origins of modern art and modern musical rhythms there!!!

It's not an isolated instance. In Carter's text* mentioned earlier these extracts are found:

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* Man and the Land, 1968 edition.

1. *"The Communist-backed group massacred priests, professors, landowners and industrialists, and the little people on the land became common-fodder for both sides.*

   General Franco's action defeated the communist-backed forces, but the country he saved was torn, impoverished, and bitterly divided. All the gold from the treasury had been siezed by Communist Russia, and thousands of Spanish children had been kidnapped and taken to Russia for indoctrination". p. 468

2. *"...and Negro Africa, with few exceptions, can be said to have regressed in most measures of achievement. The causes seem perfectly clear. The people were ill-prepared to take over their own affairs, and too ready to bite the hand extended to aid them..."* p. 185

3. East Germany. *"...the fixed prices and controlled production in a socialist planned society have stifled productivity instead of stimulating it".*

   West Germany. *"...adopted an aggressively free enterprise system after the war. Despite the loss of nearly half its territory, occupation by the Western Allies, immense destruction during the war, and the loss of many of its leading scientists to both the East and West, under a free enterprise system cities have been rebuilt and industries re-established, and now the general situation can only be described as prosperous..."* both p. 353

A British example would be that of Lebon*:

1. *"Moreover, in all three [Cayman, Saba, and Bay Islands], Whites and Negroes live side by side; but the former, though employing the latter, have avoided physical and moral degeneration by engaging in vigorous manual work and refraining from inter-marrying. How regrettable that these successes should be on so limited a scale!"* p. 64

2. *"The coastal districts [of Queensland]...were settled...by sugar-planters about 1860, who introduced labourers from Polynesia and China. The state of society which ruined Barbadoes was quickly reached. Except for a limited land-owning class, the white population was undermined and demoralized by the competition of peoples accustomed to lower standards. From about 1885 the "White Australia" policy was gradually enforced, but it was not until the First World War that the last of the Polynesians ("Kanakas") were finally repatriated".* p. 65

3. *"Till late in the last century, the white settlers in Saba refrained from miscegenation, and remained vigorous".* p. 63

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* Introduction to Human Geography, Hutchinson U.P. 1965.

Finally here are two impressions of the geographic landscapes of the deep American South. The first is from an older text by J. Russell Smith, published in 1942. Those of European stock are described as thrifty and the purveyors of a "brilliant plantation system". The Afro-American, however, is described as carefree, joyous, uneducated, and in need of a great deal of supervision. He continues, "while the negro has done the bulk of the manual labour, his race is without experience in organising industry or our kind of government or participating in democracy". He maintains that the Afro Americans in fact slowed down the South's economic development, causing social isolation for the white people and worst of all, "the negro has placed nearly all the burden of carrying civilization upon the white portion of the population".

A more recent text by Griffin, Young, and Chatham (1962, revised 1968) continues this ideological attitude. It describes Afro-Americans as ignorant and indifferent, yet able to bind the plantation owner to unprofitable operations. The situation of the "poor white planter" was made even worse as his debts increased yet he still purchased the slaves' meal and pork! "Nothing in the history of American agriculture is less attractive than the plantation going downhill. The decline meant poverty for the planter's children, and dissipation of land and slaves".

And so we could go on and rapidly turn ourselves into a John Birch society in reverse; with ample justification! I have deliberately chosen some of the most blatant examples which make explicit their ideological position; most others merely put it forward implicitly. Many more recent textbook authors have made some efforts to replace political prejudice with statements of points of view - Dicken and Philbrick, Broek and Webb, Harper and Schmudde - but those points of view, implicit or explicit, are nonetheless clearly for the *status quo*. The few exceptions where the establishment is challenged are Bunge's *Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution,* or Harvey's *Social Justice and the City;* but neither is a textbook. By and large, either explicitly or implicitly, textbooks have for obvious reasons reflected a very particular ideological stance.

Textbooks represent an institutionalised consensus of the subject matter; they permit any faculty member or student to know exactly where he stands in the discipline, and ensure the minimisation of nonconformity and deviance. The politically conservative views of most geographers shows in fact how effectively these components of the education system indoctrinate geography students into the world view of orthodox geography.

Professional Meetings

These are organised much like standard textbooks. You can close your eyes and see the format almost immediately - minimisation of philosophical, ideological, and socially relevant material, maximisation of empirical and technical reports that are supportative of the *status quo* and the disciplinary matrix. They probably have titles like "The domestication of the yak", "Computerized evaluation and representation of ...", and "Channel and ridge networks in drainage basics". Ideally such meetings should be open ended, and should contain forums for not just the latest means to measure radar shadows, but for philosophical and ideational arguments.

From the moment the conference is organised, the establishment view is stressed. Usually a group is delegated the job of organising meetings in the next local area; this group is supposedly the consensus as to what are the areas of interest (i.e. the establishment view) and carefully omits all papers which deviate from such a consensus. Sometimes a liberal ginger group, like SERGE, will mount a marginal platform to profess its involvement with "environment" or "poverty", but by its very ideological stance will suggest no more than patching up a few symptoms; again the geographical conscience will be appeased. But most of those present will not even attend the main lectures, yet alone those of the token marginals, for whatever the criteria applied to

choose papers for presentation they will really be irrelevant in the face of the fact that most are present at the meeting for more "desirable" consequences. Professional meetings now have more important functions - in an era of job shortages, to act as a clearing house for employment opportunities, and as a social reunion. Virtually no one, apart from the very naive, attends lectures except for largely sociological reasons - either someone is out to get someone, or Professor A expects that Professor B expects that Professor A will attend his lecture!

Similarly the establishment journals replicate the establishment viewpoint. We all know of many cases of repression - intended articles espousing non-capitalist ideology to anti-positivism and non-quantitative stands, the long blacklisting of William Bunge only recently lifted as he becomes a marginal-within-the-establishment, the descriptions of real conditions in Taiwan (altered despite the protests of the author concerned to the American Geographical Association and their publication, Focus), and criticism of establishment geography. One has only to glance every quarter at the contents of the Annals to know what establishment consensus means.

In the same kind of way, the actions of the professional societies, also reflect the same kind of consensus. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the recently set up AAG Task Forces. An ad hoc committee was established, to "...explore how the Association might respond to society's needs by helping to mobilize its membership in significant, large scale research efforts that are addressed to man's overriding problems" (January 1971, AAG Newsletter). This apparently non-orthodox approach for geographers, however, turns out in the August/September issue of the AAG Newsletter to be marginalist tokenism at best. "Significant" efforts included the comparison of the management and performance of urban systems in spatial terms! The preparation of comparative maps of the spatial structure of American cities! Population pressures; the relocation

of ghettos (notice, not elimination!); and a task force on poverty which will carry out "... an empirical study across a sample of metropolitan areas ..." to "... validate an interrelated process of dynamic imbalance and yield estimates of need/resource variations ... a final analysis will seek to assess variations in local potentialities ..." Yet another catalogue of who is poor and where they are spatially located; no attempt is to be made to discover the causes of poverty and rectify them.

The sensory deprivation tanks we call "professional" societies, "professional" meetings, "professional" journals, universities, departments, and courses, are all safe havens in which to perpetuate the myths and models of geography. Carefully divorced from socioeconomic reality, even in those institutions sited downtown in a city, establishment geographers can map and use, transport links, city morphology, even the distribution of incomes and attributes of poverty, without relating any of them to societal conditions.

Departmental Structure

By making departments separate and discouraging interchange, the establishment can make itself more secure. The conventionalist view is that academics do not get involved in arguments over "truth". One way to make sure this view is correct is to separate the approaches to segments of knowledge (economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, etc.,) administratively. By grouping together those academics who speak the same "language" it makes for cohesion, minimises deviance, means they accept the same ensemble of values, approaches, and "theories", and hence agree as to what the revealed truths of the discipline are; which makes it possible to create an atmosphere in which the academic can write textbooks, journal articles, prepare papers for professional meetings and task forces, teach the accepted wisdom, and generally serve the

status quo in an acceptable manner. The *department* crystallises the mechanisms and the facts which make it possible to agree as to what the students must learn.

The entire establishment of geography is organised to prevent disagreement from breaking out, and thus to make the "philosophy" of geography work, or at least seem to work. Students cannot be allowed to be a source of disagreement; they must be indoctrinated and socialised as soon as possible. One of the primary techniques of indoctrination is for the *department* to set down a pattern of prerequisite courses that must be taken before the student is allowed to think on his own about any particular area. Increasingly one such required course is *methodology*, a means of indoctrinating students with *the* geographical methods; because the faculty member teaching such a course lacks philosophical training, particularly in the epistemological aspects of enquiry, he is incapable of confronting the student with opposing philosophies and substitutes an emphasis on positivistic techniques. Thus a set departmental curriculum provides the appropriate indoctrination, sets the seal on conformity - but just in case someone slips through the mesh, one more rigidly controlled hurdle is erected - *grading*! And woe betide the faculty member who meddles with that!!

The Graduate School

The quintessence of these establishment institutions is the training of graduate students. The establishment demands orthodoxy, and this becomes an implicit part of graduate performance. Student criticism is thus viewed as deviant, and instead of a dialectical relationship of ideas, there is often a mechanical relationship between people in positions of super-ordination and subordination. The graduate student realises this and tends to "work the

system", to forget that the process of learning is very different from the process of making a living.

The drive for consensus is reinforced by the financial and occupational need for the student to get his degree. The role of style in job placement in geography often rests on socialisation processes which favor conformist students; this is particularly emphasised during the current period of job shortages. Sometimes an M.A. or a Ph.D. is granted not on the observable merits of the graduate student, but rather in terms of his amenabilities and his attractiveness as a person. Since the senior professional staff derives its status at least in part from *where* it sends its novices, nothing becomes more symbolic of failure in the eyes of academics than granting a higher degree to an unsociable person, to a maverick, to a radical, or to any deviant from the discipline's norms. In this way a chain of conformism is established that upholds the tenets and structures of mainline geography.

And the chain does not end there - the communications network is kept open in terms of grants, awards, university press publications, journal articles, references for promotion or relocation .... With such an all pervasive structure the graduate is under obvious restraint not to transgress the prevailing norms of establishment geography. "The graduate student ... learns to go along with the acceptable style of scholarly thinking, in which, 'originality' means mainly finding a problem or segments of one, that is still to be explored; 'pertinence', means mainly working within the existing body of 'scholarly opinion'. Moreover he begins to find satisfaction in the close skeptical examination of evidence, in the thoroughness of research, in accumulating a great deal of knowledge about a particular question. He develops a respect for factuality and for careful arguments that remain within clearly defined terms" (Solataroff, 1961).

Thus the graduate school emphasises the mechanical value of working in areas where information is already available; discourages problems where evidence is lacking, where information is tentative, or where different

philosophies or ways-of-knowing are involved.

Other conformities

The interweaving of these four establishment practices and the roles and viewpoints described earlier, produce a very awesome structure, the *establishment of geography*. The structure is upheld also by a number of other factors in a complex feedback system. Here we need just mention a few - research grants, for example, from government agencies and corporate institutions are hardly going to be used to subsidise research contrary to the countervailing ideology of the government or corporation. Interestingly enough, little if any geographical research has been supported by labor unions or non corporate agencies. Reliance on these kinds of research grants is dangerous - although research findings are open to all in theory, they are open only to corporate wealth *in fact;* it signifies a change from academic "independence" to corporate dependence. The corporate body turns geography from theory on the one hand and the ghetto on the other, to become nothing but a heuristic discipline. Eventually "who pays, how much, for what" becomes the dominant motif - and what pays are traffic surveys, soil surveys, marketing surveys, intelligence surveys for the C.I.A. and so on. The positivist geographer may well start by "separating facts from values", but it's only a short step to "supressing values at the expense of facts".

Positivism and neutrality also lead to a great concentration on specialized techniques of survey, design, codification, and sampling, which escalates to a strict methodological view of the purpose of geography. This has been mentioned earlier as one of the tenets of prescriptive scientism, but it is important to reintroduce it here as one of the building blocks of establishment geography. Although referring to political science as long ago

as 1954, a UNESCO statement aptly fits geography today "... a good deal of ... research carried on in universities today is aloof from the real problems of ... life. Too often research seems to be conducted for the sake of research. The topics chosen have no apparent significance, and the investigation does not throw light on any contemporary problem of importance. There is no driving force behind such research, no vital motives inspiring the work, no useful potentialities in the conclusions which emerge". The positivistic orientation of geography's disciplinary matrix simply overlooks the fact that the societal framework within which research takes place exercises a direct influence in the processing of theory and data. Husserl (1966) has called this the *fallacy of objectivism*. Thus while more and more able to systemize knowledge, geography is less and less able to reflect about its own presuppositions and is left without any way of objectifying the structuring framework of our society. The establishment thus tends to build a picture of the landscape which is actually transient in value and temporary in significance. To challenge that, and to pursue a *general educational orientation*, would be to challenge establishment geography and positivistic values. The point of course is not whether graph theory or systems analysis are theoretically valid, but whether they might become valid through a self fulfilling prophecy justified by a technocratic ideology!

Finally, *professionalism* can be cited as allied to the process of erecting an establishment geography. This involves a whole range of subprocesses from being *au courant* with the vernacular of the moment (entropy, cognitive dissonance, or poisson distribution), to an appreciation of the number of variables the latest IBM computer can deal with in a microsecond. These kinds of professional attributes serve the classic purpose of distinguishing peer group members from the crowd. Professionalism is also fostered by the highly organised society, usually at the expense of the community good; the professional

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society provides "... leadership - educational research, curriculum development, evaluation of educational performance and teacher training" (Ginsburg, 1972 quoting William Pattison). Ginsburg soon comes to the crunch point, "the ultimate rationale for the scholarly society is the advancement of knowledge, presumably that type of knowledge which its members in the aggregate, are responsible for accumulating, organising, enlarging, and applying". The basis of professionalisation comes to rest on a notion of consensus that carries over into conformism. Non-neutrality, non-conformism becomes viewed as a loss of position and professional ranking.

"If the Word was the Beginning,
Then a new beginning must need another Word"
(Carl Oglesby, from Lemon Light)

The existence of a disciplinary matrix and the supportative structures, roles, and views noted here, have led to an establishment of geography, to conformism, to intolerance frequently, to a lack of concern with humanity, to geography's present role of mirroring and supporting our social ideology.

One of the strongest factors shoring up this establishment has been the positivist approach, the refusal to view geography as an essentially human enterprise bound at one end by the biological-psychological economic constitution of men and their behaviour, and at the other by the historical career of mankind. Redfield's (1953) observations on anthropology are very apt at this point; here I am paraphrasing them and putting them into a geographic disciplinary context.

He noted that (a) however clever the design of an experiment, there is a clear difference between humanity and non-humanity, between history at the upper level and physics at the lower level;

(b) to reduce the cultural landscape, or the economic one for that matter, to a physical field, is to discompose humanity into objects, and thus to study something other than man and his landscapes;

(c) that the dominance in the social sciences of natural science models and methods is not matched by any corresponding success in existing studies based on these models and methods. The *causes célèbres* in geography would be the *gravity model*, *social physics*, Reilly's law, and most current quantitative analyses;

(d) the basis of any one social science is the study of some portion or aspect of humanity, so that any one social science discipline has a common frame of reference with (i) the other social sciences, (ii) the humanities, and (iii) philosophy;

(d) the development of an explicit concern with values - the values of the investigator no less than those of the investigated - makes nonsense of the striving for, much less the realisation of a pure, objective study of man, devoid of value functions and value orientations.

These points have been made in philosophy, economics, history, anthropology, and sociology, albeit from marginals[10]. Challenges to the

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[10] In the humanities see Roszak (1967, Grant (1967); in sociology see I. Horowitz (1964b, 1968), D. Horowitz (1971), or Colfax and Roach (1971); in economics, any of the publications of the *Union of Radical Political Economics*, especially Peabody (1971), also Walsh (1971); in anthropology see the *Social Responsibilities Symposium*, Beremann, et al (1968, 1971) - a marginal-to-the-establishment liberal critique of anthropology will be found in Murphy (1971).

establishment views of geography have been very few indeed.[11]

Rethinking Geography

Marginals without the establishment of geography, see geography rather differently from the veneer of respectability presented to the public by its leading practitioners. They see these values, beliefs, and norms as nothing more than Emperor's clothes.[12] Put simply, antiestablishmentarians believe that geography should be concerned with the human condition, that its purposes should include the enlightenment of the public and of policy makers, knocking over the establishment picture of the world, of rooting out root causes in the malfunctioning of environmental systems, and of changing society, if necessary by radical means.

The established institutions of North America, from oligopolistic and imperialistic multinational corporations to repressive and passivity-breeding schools that feed manpower to those firms, to the academic disciplines like geography which support the existing order, and to feudalistic governments that serve the wealthy interests that control us, appear incapable of dealing with fundamental issues. The quality as distinct from the quantity of life, the effects of men on these processes, the results of resource allocation, the inequalities in wealth and power distribution, etc., - all these questions cannot be treated within the established framework, except

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[11] The three or four volumes of Antipode might be included here, Sellers (1969a), Harvey (1972), the publications of the Detroit Field Expedition, and some of Bunge's work. A more liberal critique will be found in Relph (1970), Yi Fu Tuan (1971), Zelinski (1971), Thompson (1971) or Guelke (1971), and the circulated notes of SERGE. Most remains unpublished but circulates privately - I have copies of Jones (1969), Sellers (1969b, 1969c), Wisner (1970), Zarchikoff (1971), Eliot Hurst (1972d), etc.

[12] Earlier I had thought of geography as something like Alice in Wonderland (Eliot Hurst 1971b).

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insofar as solutions are not threatening to these institutions and the interest groups they serve.

Antiestablishment geography should serve to debunk and demystify the discipline, and social science in general. The conservative and at times reactionary bias of establishment geography should be made clear, and its exaggerated or false claims to accuracy and honesty exposed. Pseudo-expertise (such as technical sophistication for the sake of mystification) and the elitism it supports must be criticized and demystified, and the methodology of mainline geography must be exposed as unable to provide meaningful analyses of major social problems.

It is of course very easy to attack the establishment, to fall into premature cynicism and resignation about the organisation of geography and the strategies of its practitioners! To rethink geography means to move from a firm base, so that we can wrest control over our own lives, communities, and landscapes from the ruling class served by the geographers and other academic apologists. The bitter experience of some geographers has resulted from the inevitable clash between controlling establishments when their veneer of liberal conscience has been rubbed away, and the lack of an explicit base to fall back on (Horvath, 1971).

First we need some approaches that are not obscured by positivistic orthodox geography. Some of the questions are quite straightforward - in the context of transportation geography these kinds of analyses were recently asked for (Eliot Hurst, 1972c) -

"... (1) An analysis of the connections between socioeconomic and political structures and transportation, leading to a study of the contribution of transport to the processes of industrialisation, economic specialisation, and socioeconomic underdevelopment. Specifically a review of the means and social relations of production of transportation ... should be undertaken.

(2) A study of the role of legislative and regulatory constraints ... in their historical, political, and socioeconomic contexts. The historical development of institutions, networks, lobbies, monopolies, regulatory agencies and State corporations should also be considered and their roles in the transport system evaluated ... (3) A historical survey of models, methods, and problems used in the study of transportation ... should be pursued. Alternative ... analyses ... should be critically reviewed and evaluated ..."

In more general terms geographers should be more concerned with material wellbeing, with the human condition, with equity in resource distribution, with the responsiveness of various landscape forming institutions to human needs and the historical characteristics of those landscapes, with community development, and with the harmony of man in his total environment. These kinds of concerns provide a framework within which the analyses of contemporary geographical problems can be undertaken; currently they are not, since they are obscured by the attributes of positivism, particularly the value of neutrality. I need not pursue how they differ from current geographical concerns; what is clear is that these kinds of questions and categorisations do contains a dialectical tension - between man as the subject and man as the object of history, between freeing our minds and changing institutions; with their emphasis on man as part of ongoing history, man as part of a cultural landscape, man as a member of a socioeconomic class, and on man in the process of becoming, these kinds of analyses provide a framework for a radical geography. They force direct confrontation with the need to deal with man as a whole being, instead of taking it for granted that analysis of man, landscape, and society can be done by looking mechanistically at the fragmentary parts of some grandiose machine. Ultimately establishment geography sees "... man is replaced in all areas by the machine, not because the machine can do things 'better', but rather because all things have been reduced to what the machine is capable of doing" (Roszak, 1969, p. 23).

Conclusion

It's no use rethinking geography in abstract, or commiting it to paper where it languishes in some establishment journal, one more merit point for next year's salary review. One can analyze structures, approaches, and relationships in the ivory tower, whilst real and non theoretical human beings are undergoing visible ordeal and near starvation within only a few miles of the classroom. This is the kind of random, unreal, and irresponsible situation that is the hallmark of establishment geography, which does not by itself compel us to realise and act upon the human desperation present in the reality of geographical landscapes. As David Harvey (1972) put it so succinctly "... mapping even more evidence of man's patent inhumanity to man is counter-revolutionary in the sense that it allows the bleeding-heart liberal to pretend he is contributing to a solution he in fact is not". He continues "... nor does it [the antiestablishment approach] lie in what can only be termed moral masturbation of the sort which accompanies the masochistic assemblage of some huge dossier on the daily injustices to the populace of the ghetto, over which we beat our breasts, commiserate with each other, before retiring to our fireside comforts." In rethinking geography what we need to do is take a dual approach - develop the approaches mentioned above, which would patently analyze and display the current situation, and which would contribute to the task of socioeconomic revolution, not hinder it; and as committed educators we must politicize our students as a function of a radical education, we must pursue *praxis* rather than theory, and we must submit ourselves to critical analysis. How we live and work is as important as what we do; in overturning establishment geography we must not just effect ideas in the content of our work; we must, as far as possible, incorporate

these new values in the way we work and the way we live. To quote Harvey again "... a first initial step on this path will be to discomfort ourselves ..." and to make "... decisions that require 'real' as opposed to 'mere liberal' commitment - for it is indeed very comfortable to be a mere liberal". Change there must be in geographers, in society; the classroom must become the community, and vice versa.

We must work to develop new communal forms of working and living; we must replace our male-chauvinist attitudes; we must find ways to integrate our political, social, intellectual, and spiritual activities and end the divisions amongst ourselves which any establishment discipline and bourgeois society has fostered. By bringing the rethinking of geography down to a personal level, we work not only to free society and to free geography, but to free ourselves.

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Why has geography reflected this ideological stance? That is easy to answer; in a rare article in Peking Review, Vol. 48, 1/12/72, Hua Chih-hai, in "Understanding the world situation by studying geography", pinpoints the answer:

> "Geography is a branch of science with a clear-cut class nature. The science of geography of the bourgeoisie has from the very outset been soaked through with the aggressive and predatory nature of colonialism and imperialism. Some tsarist Russian "geographers" once publicly acknowledged that geographical research should go hand in hand with the tsarist colonial policy and move in advance of territorial acquisition and the forward movement of the boundary line. This reactionary concept of geography was based on a "theory" which cropped up towards the end of the 19th century - the "theory" that social development depends entirely on whether the physical surroundings are good or bad. From this stem other reactionary concepts of geography such as human geography and geopolitics. There is in the United States the so-called "hunger geography" which holds that the hunger and poverty of the people in the Asian-African-Latin American region result from the lack of land suitable for growing agricultural crops, from poor climate and natures resources and from the physical phenomena of too many mountains and plateaux. But the fact is just the opposite: The Asian-African-Latin American region with its vast expanse of land has rich natural resources. And the source of affluence of the imperialist countries is their ruthless exploitation of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions.

Marx and Engels had much earlier in the Communist Manifesto noted that "...what else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class". To the extent that geography and economic geography have developed theories, models and concepts, such things have reflected the values and interests of the ruling class - the fundamental mechanisms of our socio-economic system: market mechanism, profit motives, profit maximisation, etc., - and have rarely been questioned.

And how does economic geography as such fare? The following two papers written within a few months of each other reflect one person's viewpoint:

WHITHER ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY? I*

Pages 47,48, and 49 were removed from this document prior to its being submitted to the ERIC Document Reproduction Service in order to conform with copyright laws.

* printed paper accepted by the International Geographical Union, conference publications, Vol. 1, 1973, pp. 546-548.

WHITHER ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY? II*

Preamble

The paper published in the IGU Proceedings was written over a year ago; I am going to assume today that you have either read or glanced at that paper, and instead of reading it verbatim, I am going to elaborate on one or two of the ideas introduced in it.

Since I wrote that paper an editorial appeared in the British journal AREA, which illustrates my theme. It stated "...concern about American involvement in Vietnam or about conditions in black ghettos is both humane and very laudable. Is it, however, what geographers as geographers should be worrying about? There is still a convincing case to be made for divorcing academic study from value judgements..."** To suggest that geographers ought NOT to be worrying about the realities of life in most of the world, is itself a value judgement; the very thing the editorial deplores! A cruel irony indeed.

I do not particularly wish to get mixed up in the squabbles surrounding that statement, or the several attempts to define "relevance" made in that journal. It suffices to say that "relevance" is usually defined, as for example by Michael Chisholm**, as a kind of Methodist welfare crusade where geographers are seen as handing out social planning charity, the establishment liberal's smoke-screen to cover up root causes. Area's debate over "involvement" and "relevance" is doubly ironical with Northern Ireland's problems continuing to burst into the headlines.

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* The following is the oral version of the same paper.

** Area, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1971.

Ireland's problems continuing to burst into the headlines.

Economic Geography for Whom?

In my paper I ask a very simple question, but one which produces some consternation when you start to answer it. I pose the question - what is the future for economic geography? I pose the question in terms of Anglo-American geography, where two streams have dominated - the descriptive and the quantitative. Although French and German and other economic geographers do not fit quite into that dualism, nevertheless their work could be examined in the same way, with the same question in mind. In the Western world, economic geographers, whether from Britain, the U.States, Canada, France, or W. Germany, treat economic phenomena in the landscape as ends in themselves - that's true whether they are describing iron and steel production in the Ruhr, or computing the flow of goods across a geometric landscape. This is the approach of the geographer as mechanic. There is little or no attempt to place economic phenomena in the context of a world of human meaning.

It is no accident of course that those two streams should dominate economic geography; social sciences in the West have evolved into highly sophisticated, technique oriented, but still largely descriptive disciplines, with little relevance to the everyday world of the worker or peasant. Rarely has economic geography been written by the worker - it has usually in fact been written by his enemy; whole economic landscapes are in this way simply cut off from view, and their perpetuation guaranteed. Elsewhere I have pointed to the interests of those (governments, corporations) who finance and utilize research in economic

geography*; one may point to the whole establishment of geography which guarantees the status quo; or one may point to the social background (middle class) of the vast majority of economic geographers. Or one may quote Marx and Engels - "... what else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."** To the extent that economic geography has developed two streams, such streams have reflected the values and interests of the ruling class. The fundamental mechanisms of our socio-economic system in the West - the market, profit motive, etc. - have rarely been questioned.

So I found it a short step from asking "whither economic geography?" to "economic geography for whom?" For whom are we carrying out our mechanical objective studies? To make the world a better place to live in terms of global welfare? Or to make our middle class enclaves better salaried and more meritorious? Area would respond, "never mind for whom - the goal is simply knowledge; the problem is not for whom, but what and how can man know?" The questions of "whither economic geography?", and "for whom?" are irrelevant as long as our studies increase knowledge - remember their words "there is still a convincing case to be made for divorcing academic study from value judgements." In other words, knowing and living are separated; economic geography is independent in

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* in "Establishment Geography: or how to be non-relevant in three easy lessons," forthcoming Antipode.

** K. Marx & E. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848, 1965 edition, p. 55.

these terms of any particular ethical position or normative judgement.

What Area and economic geographers overlook is that to sit on the fence, perched above "reality", and to gaze "objectively" at the economic landscape around us, is nothing but a smoke-screen serving class interests. If I may quote Morris Cohen - "Some investigators have banished from their programmes all questions of value and have sought to restrict themselves to the 'objective world' so called ... but the questions of human values are inescapable, and those who banish them at the front door, admit them unavowedly and therefore uncritically at the back door." In other words, NONE of us are free of our own personal experiences, values, ideology; those who claim value freedom are in fact staking out their own positions (for the middle class status quo). The "objective" economic geographer is subjective by omission, and dangerously so because that subjectivity has crept in unnoticed.

All knowledge, whether you claim to be objective or not, has been distorted, directed, and conditioned by the phenomenal-operational-behavioural milieux I describe in the paper. Adam Smith's Principles of Economics was the reflection of the values of early capitalism; Charles Darwin's theory of evolution was Manchester liberalism writ large; contemporary economic geographers in the West, through central place models, land value and use theories, growth pole concepts, etc., replicate the effects of neocapitalism. By claiming "objectivity" the economic geographer in fact defends the existing socio-economic arrangements of neocapitalism. By claiming, "objective neutrality", the economic geographer supresses the idea that any preferable alternatives do or could exist. Critical concepts like "exploitation" and "imperialism" are excluded, or like the concept of "class alienation" are simply emasculated. Need we ask, "economic geography for whom?"

BEYOND BEHAVIOURALISM

My argument is that economic geography contains implicit political, economic, social, and ideological values. What we must do is to demystify and make clear the conservative, and at times reactionary basis of economic geography; and its exaggerated or false claims to scientific accuracy and honesty must be exposed. Pseudo-expertise - in the guise of narrow formalism, professionalism, and technical sophistication - and the elitism it supports should be criticized and destroyed.

The device outlined in the paper as an alternative to the two principle streams of economic geography*, in itself does not challenge many of the basic tenets of established geography. It still does not get at root causes. It is rather like Che Guevara's reply when asked what one could do as an academic for the revolution; he answered, "I used to be a doctor." What he meant was that capitalist society had trained him through medicine to treat people's (society's) symptoms; but to get to root causes needed a revolutionary outlook. Similarly in economic geography; to quote J.D. Bernal "...what social science needs is less use of elaborate techniques and more courage to tackle, rather than dodge, the central issues."**The issue is not whether medicine or economic geography are more, or less, useful than other fields of human endeavour - but to come back to Area again, what is is the responsibility of the economic geographer? To me, it is to go beyond description, quantification, and behaviouralism. To the phenomenal-operational-behavioural dimensions described in my published paper, we must add FIRST, a

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* TRANSPARENCIES, plus or minus descriptive note can be used here.

** Science in History, Penguin ed. 1969.

commitment; a commitment to humanity, and a commitment to replace all violent, exploitative, racist, alienative socio-economic systems. Without that commitment no economic geography has relevance. That commitment helps us to define what we do. If our personal aspirations or professionalism preclude us from doing things that are not "safe" or "respectable", then we are kidding ourselves about that commitment. SECONDLY, high status and the respect and rewards of the professional establishment of geography must be ignored.

THIRDLY, our loyalties must not be to the profession of economic geography or to any bourgeoise social science or institution. Our loyalty must be to our fellow human beings. We must go beyond the liberal radicals in economic geography like Richard Morrill, who simply show loyalty to the system from which they gain benefits. We must be partisans.

FOURTHLY, we cannot accept without reservation the code of ethics and responsibilities of the establishment economic geographer. Ethics are not abstract ideals, they are santifications of certain types of social relations, purposes, and loyalties. Conventional ethics entrap us into the support of things we do not support politically.

Supported by these four premises, I see economic geography as undertaking a two-pronged attack; ONE, by analyzing the shoddiness of the discipline's social science clothes, we should expose our socio-economic system in all its ideological nakedness, and denounce those of our colleagues who continue to enjoy the physical comforts that their pseudo-scientific suit affords them. What we have to show them is that when they talk about "economically-rational man", "economic inputs and outputs" or even a descriptive device like "the central place model", that they are hiding the naked truths of economic exploitation, cultural alienation, imperialism and so on.

SECOND, we should pursue research, and develop the theory required, within our own milieux, our own communities, by doing analyses of economic structures for political movements that promote the necessary socio-political and economic changes in society. This offers a whole range of actions and programmes, not only in the Third World on our doorsteps (Quebec, Northern Ireland, N. American Indians) but amongst the bourgeoisie too.

To those four premises and two approach points, post behavioural economic geography should also view our economic landscapes from six bases: from the point of view of (1) material wellbeing;

(2) equity in resource distribution;

(3) responsiveness of institutions to human needs and the historical characteristics of a society;

(4) human development;

(5) community development, and

(6) the harmony of man and his natural environment.

These '4' by '2' by '6' bases are not discreet, but using those avenues we can begin to ask questions that established economic geography in the West obscures.

In short I am saying that economic geography ought to emphasize <u>people</u> as part of ongoing history; <u>people</u> as part of a national or large group culture; <u>people</u> as members of social classes; <u>people</u> in the process of <u>becoming</u>. This total framework forces direct confrontation with the need to deal with people as whole beings instead of taking it for granted that analysis of people, economic landscape, and society can be looked at in a fragmentary way.

To do this requires more than the study of geographic medicine; it calls for the practice of that medicine following the example of Che Guevera and thousands like him.

I do not mean to imply here that economic geography is merely to be the training ground for revolutionary cardres, who would rush out to the "workers" with empty hands and empty heads to offer nothing more than muscles or vocal chords (they are more a part of the problem rather than the solution) - to do that would be to misunderstand the socio-economic realities of our world in the way the editor of Area, the Richard Morrills and the Brian Berrys do. What we need is a radical critique of how the existing society operates in the economic landscape. Keeping an oppressed class in ignorance is one of the principal instruments of its oppression. The authentic consciousness of an oppressed people entails an understanding of the necessity to abolish oppression.

Nor do I mean, that economic geographers should set themselves up as "experts"; to do that would simply be to perpetuate the rule of the professional elite over the uninitiated. Thus in essence we should be working to put ourselves out of work; we must engage the community and give them the knowledge and experience to carry on without "experts" Through this type of activity more and more people will gain the knowhow, which they can spread in their communities, and which will help people to fight the false witness of, in our case, establishment economic geography.

Economic geography should provide not just the intellectual experience (though it is very important to see our economic landscapes in a way that is all the more radical for being broad ranging,

informative, utilising a wide range of material) - but besides the intellectual experience we need the gut experience, the revelation of the oppressed and the oppressor, and an understanding of how to abolish that oppression. Through the intellectual and gut experiences, through the community, through a fusion of theory and practice, we can through economic geography expose the existing repressive structures and hopefully spread the emancipation of the oppressed.

WHITHER ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY?

Which way shall we go - shall we take the Cartesian world view of establishment economic geography, and surreptitiously manufacture "abstract" economic landscapes in order to counterfeit "reality"?; shall we, having reduced something to an abstraction (whether literally through a positivistic search for system, pattern and form, or through description via middle class blinkered eyes) then convince ourselves that that abstraction is, in fact, real. So real in fact are those abstractions that many economic geographers reject "rats", "ghettos", "hungry children", and "oppressed classes" including women, as mere imagery. Conventional economic geography reminds me of that story told by James Thurber, who once sat by his window watching men cut down elm trees to clear a site for an institution in which to confine people who had been driven insane by the cutting down of elm trees. For elm trees read central place or input/output analysis.

Or shall we take to heart the words of J.D. Bernal again - "... the world outlook of capitalism of today is not one of aspiration to a brighter future, but one of desperately clinging to present inequalities that can be glossed over but cannot be indefinitely preserved. Insofar as the social sciences reflect the values of capitalism they are inevitably bound to regress. They may well go even farther in their

apologetic and mystifying role, and add many new chapters of statistics and logical and psychological analyses, but of no fundamental importance. But they need not, even in the capitalist world, reflect these values ... we are entering a period of critical re-examination of the basis of society and of human behaviour." Whither economic geography? - a continuation of economic geography as a study of the mechanical shell of the world of Thurberelm trees, a further mystification of socio-economic reality. Or shall we liberate our discipline? Drawing on the methods and accumulated data of earlier economic geographies, shall we now critically re-examine our position in a radical way, shall we throw open our discipline to alternative epistemologies, including that of Marxism. Not to mystify and obfuscate the realities of life under capitalism, but to clarify and ultimately to challenge and change a wasteful, exploitative and irrational socio-economic system.

CONCLUSION

In the best of all possible worlds, with no man starving and with no small children going without food and medical treatment, with no injustice and mechanised oppression, and no direct and racist exploitation of one group of people by another, it would be an interesting academic exercise to describe economic landscapes by central place models or out-of-kilter algorithms; to write in the "humanistic" tradition of the "quality of life"; to analyze the distribution of Kellogs cornflakes or Jello's instant puddings. But we do not live in such a world, and it i not merely incorrect, but brutal, violent, devious,and self-deceived, to speak, write, or teach as if our greatest difficulties and most important challenges were divorced from the realities of life in our socio economic landscapes. We as economic geographers can ignore injustice and can take on the ice cold capability of an aesthetic self-removal from

the consciousness of guilt and pain; we can, and we do. But that is not "economic geography", for "economic geography" is a study of people and the realities of their socio-economic milieux, a reality which is impacted on the landscape; anything less is merely supportive of the status quo.

> "If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution."
>
> Mao Tse Tung.